¹ In Sebeok (1981), also quoted in Brent 1993, p. 2f.

² It is true that in 1923 a small edition of some of Peirce's essays was published under the title `Chance, Love and Logic', editor M.R. Cohen, with a foreword by John Dewey. Nonetheless, it was not until 1931 that the more concerted effort to publish Peirce's works mentioned above began. During the years 1931-1935 six volumes (I-VI) of an eight volume series: `Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce' were published, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. These six volumes were later reissued as three volumes in 1960. Volumes VII-VIII which were edited by Arthur W. Burks, were published in 1958. In the eight volumes of `Collected Papers...' the textual materials are structured more or less thematically rather than chronologically, something which makes it difficult to follow the development of Peirce's ideas over time. At the present time there is a project in process that aims over time to publish a fully chronological version of Peirce's entire writings in thirty volumes. This work was initiated at the beginning of the 1980's as the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana - Purdue University at Indianapolis by Edward C. Moore, first under the general editorship of Max H. Fisch, thereafter of Christian Kloesel, and at present under the direction of Nathan Houser. Five of the thirty proposed volumes have been published so far

³ All the following were published in Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 7 (1867): "On an Improvement in Boole's Calculus of Logic." (pp. 250-261); "On the Natural Classification of Arguments." (pp. 261-287); "On a New List of Categories." (pp. 287-298); "Upon the Logic of Mathematics." (pp. 402-412) and "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension." (pp. 416-432).

⁴ These were: "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man.", Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2 (1868), pp. 103-114; "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities."; JSP 2 (1868), pp. 140-157 and "Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities.", JSP 2 (1869), pp. 193-208.

⁵ "The Fixation of Belief.", Popular Science Monthly 12 (November 1877), 1-15; "How to Make Our Ideas Clear.", PSM 12 (January 1878), 286-302; "The Doctrine of Chances.", PSM 12 (March 1878), pp. 604-615; "The Probability of Induction.", PSM 12 (April 1878), pp. 705-718; "The Order of Nature.", PSM 13 (June 1878), pp. 203-217 and "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis.", PSM 13 (August 1878), pp. 470-482.

⁶ These were: "Comment se fixe la croyance.", Revue Philosophique de la France et de L'Étranger, 6 (December 1878), pp. 553-569; "Comment rendre nos idées claires.", RPFL'É 7 (January 1879), pp. 39-57.

⁷ For a recent examination of why this application may have failed, see Brent 1993, pp. 278-289

⁸ Ransdell has edited and made available via the Internet the entire contents of the whole application document folder MS L75 - including a collection of five draft versions of the nine explanatory sections of the application and the appendix containing 36 "Memoirs" (see Ransdell 1994b for further details of how these are structured and presented) - the originals of which are under the custody of the Department of Philosophy of Harvard University. The electronic document folder is denoted as MS L 75 since the original manuscripts of Peirce's Carnegie application, together with five draft versions of the same are stored physically in folder L75 at the Houghton Library, Harvard University (see Neuman (no date available, but probably 1994) for some more detail on this point). In passing it should also be mentioned that the Houghton Library has custody over approximately 90,000 typescript and manuscript pages comprising the main Peirce corpus, which though probably not representing Peirce's entire Nachlass, is certainly the largest collection of his original philosophical and scientific writings existing anywhere in the world.

⁹ See note in MS L75, electronic full text version, p. 3. The whole MS L75 folder has been made available by the Electronic Peirce Consortium via World Wide Web and in ASCII text format here.

¹⁰ Based on this insight, Ransdell goes on to forward the thesis that the entire corpus of Peirce's work, both published and unpublished, could be organised thematically (for example as a hypertext web) using the skeleton overview provided by the tabular version of the thirty six memoirs given by Peirce in the application as a topical schema, supposing that his writings were decomposed into appropriate topical units. This would allow us to see how in fact, as Ransdell formulates it: "Peirce actually did work out his system of thought in as much detail as anybody could reasonably be expected to do." [ibid.] I too believe that such a project would be a highly useful and enlightening undertaking, but any further discussion of this particular theme must, however, be considered as falling outside the scope of this present essay.

¹¹ Murphey is referring here to "The Architecture of Theories", published for the first time in The Monist, January 1891. CP 6.7-34)

¹² Murphey notes that this particular paper was never published, but Peirce expanded it instead into a series of five articles which appeared during the next year or so in The Monist: "The Architecture of Theories" (CP 6.7-34), "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined" (CP 6.35-65), "The Law of Mind" (CP 6.103-163), "Man's Glassy Essence" (CP 6.238-271), and "Evolutionary Love" (CP 6.287-317). There is also a sixth paper (CP 6.588-618) which is a reply to criticisms made of the other five by Paul Carus, editor of The Monist, but this, although providing some important clarifications of points in the other papers, was not part of the original series.

¹³ Cited in Förster 1993, p. xvi

¹⁴ Cited in Förster 1993, p. xvi

¹⁵ Letter from Kant to Marcus Herz after May 1781, AK 10:269, cited in Förster 1993, p. xxxi.

¹⁶ "Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics" [AK 4:263], cited in Förster 1993, p. xxxi.

¹⁷ Cited in Murphey 1993, p. 2. See the reference list at the end of this essay for a description of the various citation systems adopted here for references to Kant's works.

¹⁸ Ransdell comments in this connection that: "... Peirce has a marvellous ability to redescribe the same subject-matter from a seemingly endless number of different points of view, so that the moves made from a given description of something can lead in quite different directions than those made from a different description of the same thing. Thus there must be, I would guess, something like two hundred verbally different formulations of the generic representation relation, some of which differ only in a relatively insignificant respect, some of which, however, seem at first quite unlike the others and can lead in importantly different directions." (Ransdell 1994, p. 7), and he goes on to note too (in a footnote) that: "This is why it seems to people who read Peirce superficially that he is forever changing his mind, when in fact he is just taking another look at the same thing or heading in a different direction from it. Real things have innumerable true descriptions - it is the mark of a merely fictitious or made up entity that it is only what it is described as being - and there is no reason to suppose a priori that when we are attempting to describe the "essential" - that is, the most cognitively important - aspects of something real that we should be able to capture that in a single perfect description. Reality has facets." (ibid. p. 7 footnote)

¹⁹ Additions in square brackets [...] in the table have been added in the transcribed text-version of MS L75 by Ransdell for purposes av clarification.

²⁰ Cited in Liszka 1996, p. 109.

²¹ This does not of course preclude that Peirce may actually have used them at some stage. Ransdell comments for instance in an editorial note to one of the memoirs that: "[o]ther Peircean terms for `stechiology' (or `stechiologic') are e.g. `universal grammar', `speculative grammar', and `philosophical grammar'. `Critic' is usually referred to as `critical logic' or simply as `logic' (in what he calls `the narrow sense', in distinction from the broad sense in which it is equivalent to `semiotic'). `Methodeutic' is also `universal rhetoric', `speculative rhetoric', and `philosophical rhetoric'." [Note to Memoir 13 FV (364-365)]

²² Note here too, the similarity between Peirce's characterisation of the symbol as "a living thing", and Kant's characterisation of architectonic in "Critique of Pure Reason" cited previously: "The whole is thus an organized unity (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio). It may grow from within (per appositioninem). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by addition of a new member, but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes." [A832f B860f]

²³ These two definitions are to be found in an unpublished manuscript, August 21, 1861, IBs, Box 8, entitled "Principles". Cited in Murphey 1993, p. 21.

²⁴ From "New Names and Symbols for Kant's Categories", May 21, 1859, 1B Box 8. Cited in Murphey 1993, p. 34-35

²⁵ From "A Treatise of the Major Premisses of Natural Sciences", fragment. Cited in Murphey 1993, p. 21

²⁶ "On Classification", fragment, p. 1, 1B2 Box 2 (Alternative version of "Principles", probably 1861). Cited in Murphey 1993, p. 29.

²⁷ Interestingly, this distinction between abstractions and expressions of abstractions is probably the beginnings of the distinction Peirce later was to make between legisign and sinisign (or alternatively, type and token), but these actual concepts did not emerge however in his writings until considerably later on, probably around 1903. (See for instance CP 2.243-52 and 2.254-65)

²⁸ "Why We Can Reason on the Infinite", October 1859, 1B2 Box 8. Cited in Murphey 1993, p. 30.

²⁹ Immanuel Kant (1762), in Buchenau (ed.), 1912, Immanuel Kant Werke, Berlin, II, 49-65. Referred to and discussed in Murphey 1993 (1961), p. 57.

³⁰ Syllogism of the first-figure form:

All M is P (P belongs to all M)

All S is M (M belongs to all S)

\ all S is P (therefore P belongs to all S)

where S is the minor term, P the major term and M the middle term.

³¹ "Logic: 1865-1867"

³² Murphey notes that four draft versions of this paper remain, and his discussion of how the central themes that make up the main content of the final version are developed and reworked in the course of the four drafts makes fascinating and interesting reading (see Murphey 1993, pp. 64-94), but for the sake of brevity we shall not draw in the four drafts in our discussions here, but merely hold us to the final version. In this context it is however worth noting that, as Murphey also points out (ibid., p. 106) that of the four drafts of the "New List" , one has no heading, two are entitled "Chapter I", and one is entitled "Introduction", implying that Peirce intended the "New List" to be an introduction to a more extended work on logic which was never actually completed. His subsequent publications from 1868 "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" [CP 5.318-357], "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" [CP 5.264-317], and "Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic" [CP 5.318-357] were probably also thought as for inclusion in this volume, since they are developments of the doctrine of semiotic phenomenalism forwarded in "The New List".

³³ The nature of the interrelatedness of the categories of Being, Substance and the three Accidents is perhaps more clearly discernible in Peirce's diagrammatic formulation in Draft 4 of the "New List":

	| Being	| Quality
Categories	{ Accidents	{ Relation
	| Substance	| Representation

³⁴ Although Peirce's formulation of his Pragmatic Maxim was first published in 1878, he did not then refer to the term Pragmatism in any of his writings at this time. In fact, the notion of Pragmatism did become well-known before in 1898 when William James first used the term in a lecture given at the University of California, entitled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results". Peirce later declared himself dissatisfied by the utilitarian interpretation that James and others gave to the notion of Pragmatism, and he went so far as to coin a new term, "Pragmaticism" for his own doctrine, in the hope of making people aware of the distinction between the two. This term never really became popular, and Peirce is thus today in philosophical circles generally considered as first and foremost the originator of Pragmatism.

³⁵ Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, X, 341. This paper was first read publicly by De Morgan in April 1860.

³⁶ Around this time Peirce published a paper on logic entitled "Description of Notation for the Logic of Relatives", and he began subsequently to consider how the implications of this new logic could be incorporated into his own philosophical system. Peirce's own work on the development of the logic of relations, with De Morgan as his starting point is that which he is best known for in this particular field of science. In 1883 he published "The Logic of Relatives" in a collection of papers by himself and his students at Johns Hopkins University - "Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University". In 1885 in "On the Algebra of Logic - A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" he interpreted propositional logic as a calculus of truth-values, and defined necessary truth as truth for all truth-value assignments to sentential letters. Peirce's calculus of relations formed the basis of the Boole-Schröder algebra, which in turn formed much of the basis for Russell and Whitehead's "Principa Mathematica" (1910-15, 3 volumes) which superseded it. He is thus considered, together with his student collaborator at Johns Hopkins in the 1880's, Oscar H. Mitchell, and the German logician Gottlob Frege as one of the founders of quantification theory (see Audi (ed.) 1995, p. 567).

³⁷ In Weiner & Young (eds.) 1952, p. 138

³⁸ The theory of infinitesimals has since been superseded in modern mathematics by the theory of limits.

³⁹ See Murphey 1993, pp. 238-288 for discussion of Peirce's theories of number and finite and transfinite sets in relation to Cantor and Russell's theories of the same.

⁴⁰ See also Eisele (ed.) 1976.

⁴¹ Benjamin Peirce, "Linear Associative Algebra", American Journal of Mathematics, IV, 97 (1881), notes and addenda by C.S. Peirce. Cited in Murphey 1993, p. 229.

⁴² ibid.

⁴³ Wilder 1949, pp. 2f, 12-15. Paraphrased in Murphey 1993, p. 281.

⁴⁴ O.H. Mitchell, "On a New Algebra of Logic", in Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University, 1885 pp. 72-106, pp [CP 3.351-354; 3.393ff]

⁴⁵ These terms came later to be written as (x)Fx and (Ex)Fx respectively. See also footnote 36 above.

⁴⁶ See Murphey's discussion of this (1993, p. 310)

⁴⁷ See Murphey 1993, p. 313f for a more exhaustive discussion of this point.

⁴⁸ Peirce's cosmology is largely presented in the five Monist papers mentioned previously (see footnote 12)