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Peirce's method of philosophical inquiry

Peirce's method of philosophical inquiry was, then, basically "scientifically" or "empirically" oriented, in the sense that he would first begin by formulating in writing the particular position he found himself holding at any given time as systematically and completely as possible. Having done so, he would submit this particular position to hard and uncompromising criticism, and when he discovered certain unsolved problems within it, he would proceed to solve these bit by bit - working at such times from the bottom-up, so to say. During these "bottom-up processing" periods of his wider philosophical endeavour he would pay little or no attention to the remainder of the system, or to the system as a whole, and only return to these again after he considered that the more specific problems which he had been working on had been solved in a satisfactory way for the time being. Then, and only then, would he begin on a revision of the whole system in order to try and take account of these new findings. In Murphey's account (which I am inclined to evaluate as probably the most soundly historically grounded and thoroughly documented portrayal of Peirce's philosophical development available to date) it is Peirce's logic that the whole of his architectonic order is built upon, and it is thus this logic that provides the creative and dynamic element in the further development of his philosophy. From this it follows that with each major discovery that Peirce made in his logic, then some major reformulation of his philosophy should be seen to have taken place. This is what in fact seems to be the case. Murphey writes in this connection:

"Peirce's Philosophy went through four major phases. The first extended from the earliest of his papers which we have, dated 1857, until 1865 or 1866, and was very much a Kantian phase based on Kantian logic. The second began with the irreducibility of the three syllogistic figures in 1866 and extended until 1869 or 1870. The third was inaugurated by the discovery of the logic of relations and continued until 1884. And the last stemmed from the discovery of quantification and of set theory and continued until his death. (Murphey 1993, p. 3)

He goes on to point out that Peirce himself did not consider these different phases as constituting work on different systems, but regarded them rather as part of a constant process of revision of a single over-all architectonic system. After each revision Peirce preserves as much of the preceding system as possible, and only tinkers with those particular doctrines that had come into conflict with conclusions he had drawn from his new logical investigations, or which proved unsatisfactory on other grounds. Generally Peirce tended to maintain the terminology and over-all outline of his system, even in cases where the doctrines had been radically altered. I think it is reasonable, too, to assume in this connection that he did not make terminological changes unless he had some quite specific reason for doing so.

This point of view seems somewhat in conflict with a number of other commentators, who often tend to refer to Peirce's habit of coining new terms as more of an irritation than a deliberate intellectual or philosophical strategy on his side. Winfried Nöth, in a brief presentation of Peirce's philosophy in his comprehensive "Handbook of Semiotics" (Nöth 1990, pp. 39-47) notes for instance that "In his definition of the sign, Peirce introduced an idiosyncratic and changing terminology that has been adopted by few of his followers" (ibid., p. 42). Liszka (1996, p. ix) too, comments for example in the preface to his book that "Peirce also has an annoying habit of neologizing, which is compounded by the fact that he also gives several names to the same concept." And indeed, this particular issue has frequently been a source of discussion within the wider Peirce research community over the years, as Nöth also points out: "...there have been many terminological changes in the numerous papers on semiotic topics which Peirce produced during the half century of his semiotic research, and these changes have often raised questions of whether they also involve a change of theory (cf. Weiss & Burks 1945: 383)" (ibid., p. 40).

My opinion on this matter, which I believe I also share to some degree with both Murphey and Ransdell, is that Peirce in many, if not most, cases quite consciously adopted the two strategies outlined by Liszka above (i.e. neologizing and use of multiple terms for more or less the same idea) as a means of focusing on, and thus casting new light upon, some central and problematic area or other in his basic system. His frequent creation of neologisms and the use of multiple terms for what can often appear to be the same basic concept (which in Peircean terms could be considered as already complex interpretants on the verge of some further development whereby they would be able to function as new signs) can then be seen more as a kind of philosophical tool for "making strange" or challenging his own current conceptions of the problem in hand, and thus opening up for the possibility of new avenues of investigation around the problem. Some classical examples of this are the relationship between Peirce's use of the terms "Representamen" and "Sign", and the proliferation of terms he used at various times in his discussions of the concept of "Abduction", such as "Retroduction", "Hypothesis", "Retroductive Inference" etc..[18]

Since the publication of the full chronological edition of Peirce's writings (see under "Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce" in the literature reference section of this essay for more details on this project) is still at a quite nascent stage of development (as yet there have only been published 5 of 30 proposed volumes), further investigation in any great depth of this particular issue of exactly why, when and how Peirce might have used this particular technique must be considered merely an interesting empirical and interpretational project for the future. I shall nonetheless come back briefly to this issue in conjunction with Peirce's choice of terms for the representation of his three orders of his logic a bit later on in this essay.

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On terms and the Classification of the Sciences in the memoirs

In Memoir 1 (MS L75, 350-357): On The Classification Of The Theoretic Sciences Of Research Peirce sets down in tabular form his basic classification of the sciences - of which a substantial part forms the conceptual basis for the 36 Memoirs that make up the appendix to his application - as follows[19]:

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES

A. Theoretical Science

I. Science of Research

i. Mathematics

ii. Philosophy, or Cenoscopy

1. Categorics [= phenomenology]

2. Normative Science

a. Esthetics
b. Ethics
c. Logic [= semiotic]
[philosophical grammar]
[critical logic]
[philosophical rhetoric]

3. Metaphysics

iii. Idioscopy, or Special Science

1. Psychognosy

a. Nomological or General Psychology

b. Classificatory

o. Linguistics
o. Critics
o. Ethnology

c. Descriptive

o. Biography
o. History
o. Archeology

2. Physiognosy

a. Nomological or General Physics

o. Dynamics

1. Of particles
2. Of aggregations

o. Elaterics and Thermotics
o. Optics and Electrics

b. Classificatory

o. Crystallography
o. Chemistry
o. Biology

c. Descriptive

o. Astronomy
o. Geognosy

II. Science of Review, or Synthetic Philosophy (Humboldt's "Cosmos"; Comte's "Philosophie Positive")

B. Practical Science, or the Arts

From the above, it seems quite clear that Peirce intended the 36 Memoirs to offer a rather detailed working out of the first section of his classification of what he referred to as Theoretical Science, namely The Science of Research. If we include the references to the subdivisions of mathematics from Liszka's version, as well as the three subdivisions of Metaphysics mentioned by Murphey (1995, p. 366), this would be as follows:

A. Theoretical Science

I. Science of Research

i. Mathematics

a. Of Logic
b. Of Discrete Series
c. Of Continua

ii. Philosophy, or Cenoscopy

1. Categorics [= phenomenology]

2. Normative Science

a. Esthetics
b. Ethics
c. Logic [= semiotic]
[philosophical grammar]
[critical logic]
[philosophical rhetoric]

3. Metaphysics

a. Ontology
b. Religious Metaphysics
c. Physical Metaphysics

We note at this point that in the diagrammatic version of the scheme of the sciences provided in Liszka (1996, p. 4, Fig. 1) there are certain differences in the labelling of components in this part of the table. "Theoretical Science" is for instance labelled "The Formal Sciences", while "Categorics" is labelled "Phenomenology". Liszka has also opted to use other terms than those which Ransdell has inserted in square brackets above for the first and last of the three subdivisions of Logic (or Semeiotic), namely "(Semeiotic) Grammar" and "Universal Rhetoric". In his view whatever choice of terminology one might make today for the representation of Peirce's various conceptions of the orders of logic is not particularly important, as he makes clear in the passage cited below:

"Semeiotic is a normative science which is an order within the class of philosophic sciences. As a normative science it is concerned with the first of the primary values truth, goodness, beauty. But according to Peirce, it is concerned with the truth in three regards, which define three branches of the discipline (CP 1.191): the study of the sign's grammar, logic and rhetoric. This parallels the classical trivium in liberal studies, although of course with reference to the sign. Grammar is the study of the formal features of the sign and its modes of expression; logic is concerned with the manner in which signs can be used to discern truth; while rhetoric is the investigation into the manner in which signs are used to communicate and express claims within a community. These studies are variously named by Peirce, but the preferred usages here will be semeiotic grammar, critical logic, and universal rhetoric. These divisions are probably more familiar to many readers under Charles Morris's nomenclature: syntax or syntactics, semantics and pragmatics." (Liszka 1996, pp. 9-10)

Max Fisch (1978) has, however, documented elsewhere that Peirce's usage of various terminological variants was actually ordered chronologically in a fairly systematic way as shown in the following table[20]:

Of Liszka's three preferred usages above, `semeiotic grammar', `critical logic', and `universal rhetoric', only `universal rhetoric' actually appears in Fisch's overview of Peirce's own terms above. Similarly, Ransdell's choice of alternative terms: `philosophical grammar', `critical logic' and `philosophical rhetoric' are not to be found there either.[21]

Both Ransdell and Liszka are however in their accounts in this particular respect largely concerned with the important task of showing how different aspects of Peirce's philosophy fit into a framework of contemporary conceptualisations - a project which is valuable since it illustrates in a functional way the powerful influence that Peirce's thinking has exerted on the subsequent development of contemporary theories of meaning in general and the philosophy of language more specifically. Since we are for the moment concerned with the historical development of Peirce's thinking seen in relation to his use of terms, we shall continue to concentrate on those that he actually uses in his Carnegie application, these being seen in relation to the five triads of terms mentioned in Max Fisch's list above.

If we go on to look more closely at the chronological overview provided by Fisch above, we can see that the variations in the usages of different terms to represent the orders of semeiotic in the course of Peirce' career clearly does seem to mirror the steady development and reworking of Peirce's semeiotic over time. This close relationship between the actual technical terminology chosen by Peirce and the changing configurations of systemic meanings associated with the wide referential scope of these terms is hardly surprising, given Peirce's close and consistent attention to questions of the ethics of terminology throughout his life. He wrote for example as early as March 1862 that:

"By his system of nomenclature, Sir William Hamilton has conferred an immense boon not alone on his own school but on all English philosophers who believe in anchoring words to fixed meanings. I deeply regret this and am not one of these. That is the best way to be stationary, no doubt. But nevertheless I believe in mooring our words by applications and letting them change their meaning as our conceptions of the things to which we have applied them progress." (WI: 58, cited in Daube-Schackat 1996, p. 383)

Forty one years later, in 1903 (we might note in passing too, that this is also the year after the Carnegie Institute application was submitted), Peirce wrote an article entitled "Ethics of Terminology" (see Weinsheimer 1996 for a recent discussion of this in relation to hermeneutic semiotics; and an earlier, thorough discussion of the "Ethics" in Ketner 1981), where he stated in the course of an attempted exegesis of the problem of exactitude:

"For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but the meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones" (CP 2.222, cited in Daube-Schackat 1996, p. 383.)[22]

The thesis of progression and development of the architectonic as reflected in the changing terminology used by Peirce for the expression of the three orders of logic above becomes even more clearly delineated if we move on to examine even more closely Murphey's historical exegesis of the development of Peirce's thought (Murphey 1993, p. 3), which he divides as we will remember into four main developmental phases:

1) from 1857-1865 or 1866, ("the Kantian phase, based on Kantian logic")

2) from 1866-1869 or 1870 (after the discovery of the irreducibility of the three syllogistic figures)

3) from 1870-1884 (after the discovery of the logic of relations)

4) 1884 - 1914 (after the discovery of quantification and of set theory)

The two first triads of terms in Fisch's (1973) overview, namely: `Universal Grammar', `Logic' and `Universal Rhetoric' and `General Grammar', `General Logic' and `General Rhetoric', from Spring 1865 and May 1865 respectively, all had their origins then, in Peirce's "Kantian phase" (1857-1865 (or 1866)), whereas the third triad: `Formal Grammar', `Logic' and `Formal Rhetoric' from 1867, belongs to the phase after his discovery of the irreducibility of the three syllogistic figures (1866-1869 (or 1870)), and the fourth and fifth triads: `Pure Grammar', `Logic Proper' and `Pure Rhetoric' from 1897, and `Speculative Grammar', `Critic' and `Methodeutic' from 1903, belong to the final period (1884-1914), i.e. after Peirce's discovery of quantification and set theory. Put into tabular form this would be as follows:

Developmental phase	Period	Terminology	for the	Semeiotic
"Kantian" phase	1857-1865 (or 1866)	Universal Grammar General Grammar	Logic General Logic	Universal Rhetoric General Rhetoric
After discovery of the irreducibility of the three syllogistic figures	1866-1869 (or 1870)	Formal Grammar	Logic	Formal Rhetoric
After discovery of the logic of relations	1870-1884
After discovery of quantification and set theory	1884-1914	Pure Grammar Speculative Grammar	Logic Proper Critic	Pure Rhetoric Methodeutic

We shall now go on to look at this in more specifically in systemic developmental terms - i.e. placing the terminological shifts more closely into relation with Peirce's development of his architectonic through a process of philosophical inquiry where revisions are steadily being made over time as external exigencies and theoretical discoveries made the need for this apparent. In the following rather compact review of the general development of Peirce's philosophical system, I have chosen to follow fairly closely Murphey's sequencing of the four developmental phases mentioned above, and to some extent also his discussions of these, interspersing the whole with my own comments and interpretations, especially in relation to possible correlations between changes in Peirce's basic conceptual framework and the various terminological changes he made in the designation of his central three disciplines of semeiotic that were briefly presented above.